The Communist Party of China : a people-centered governing ecosystem more than a political party
Source . laurentmichelon.substack.com – september 2026 – Laurent Michelon
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“China is ruled by a one-party authoritarian dictatorship”1. This is the kind of propaganda slop that will pop up at the top of the search query of any Westerner who has a genuine interest in understanding the Chinese political system.
Part of the Western misreading of China comes from the over-simplified explanation of China’s governance, in essence the over-reliance on the “one-party” nature to describe the Chinese state.
Apart from the fact that there are eight opposition parties in China’s National People’s Congress, there is a misunderstanding that comes from looking at the Communist Party of China as a political party, in the Western sense of the word.
Western parties represent specific segments, classes, or interest groups of society. They compete in periodic, multi-party elections to win control of the government. They are distinct from state institutions like the civil service, military, and judiciary. By failing to give the winner of elections effective control of the administration, the judiciary and the military, the Western system has allowed the formation at its core of a Deep State, that renders the electoral process largely performative and inefficient to represent and execute the will of the people.
In her 1950 “Note on the General Abolition of Political Parties”, French philosopher Simone Weil went as far as suggesting that political parties were the core of the problem in Western societies, as they are “a machine for generating collective passion”, an organization structured to “exert collective pressure on the thinking of each of its members”, and that the primary and sole purpose of a political party is “its own growth, without any limits”. She concluded that parties should therefore be abolished.
Conversely, the CPC holds a constitutional monopoly on power and does not face electoral competition. It defines itself as a “ruling group” that encompasses and represents the interests of the entire nation and society as a whole. Rather than operating alongside state machinery, the CPC permeates all levels of public administration, state-owned enterprises, and social organizations. It is fused directly with the Chinese state, controlling the government, the military (People’s Liberation Army), the courts, and the police2. Finally, the party operates on the principle of “democratic centralism”, meaning open discussion and public consultation at the grassroots level is permitted and encouraged prior to decisions, but once a policy is set by the top leadership, absolute unity and obedience are mandatory.
Following these key principles, China calls itself a “whole-process people’s democracy”. In his public speeches since 2019, President Xi Jinping has been developing his concept of “holistic people’s democracy” (literally whole-process people’s democracy 全过程人民民主), which was enshrined in the Organic Law in 2021.
This political system, which is more participatory than liberal democracy, “includes direct and indirect democratic suffrage, popular consultation, and a results-oriented management and supervisory decision-making process3”, unlike liberal democracies where voters are only activated at the time of voting, then become “dormant” immediately after casting their ballot, with no means of supervising the actions of their elected representatives during their term of office. Socialist democracy is an ongoing process of engagement between the government and citizens, aimed at developing public policies that meet the people’s needs and can be adjusted in real time rather than only at election time. Thus, China aspires to be “a democracy that works”4, thanks to the CPC’s ability to constantly gauge the expectations of the people, who are placed at the center of the decision-making process5: public policies are published before being implemented, giving the people the opportunity to voice their opinions, and are often tested at the local level before being rolled out nationwide, in a consultative process that moves from the top down and back up again—a process that has no equivalent in liberal democracies.
The differences between the Western and Chinese models are structural and functional. The primary distinction lies in representation and purpose. Western parties typically aggregate and advocate for specific segments of the electorate, such as labor, business, or distinct ideological groups, accepting political polarization as a natural outcome of pluralism. In contrast, the Communist Party of China asserts that it represents the holistic interests of the entire nation, aiming to transcend factional divides to maintain national unity and direct long-term development.
Another critical distinction is the relationship between the organization and the state. Western parties remain organizationally distinct from the state bureaucracy and seek to influence it through electoral victories. The Communist Party of China is deeply embedded within the state, the military, state-owned enterprises, educational institutions, and civil society. Furthermore, leadership selection in the West relies on popular voting, public campaigning, and fundraising dynamics. The Chinese system utilizes a prolonged, meritocratic process of internal selection, continuous performance evaluation, and progressive administrative responsibility across increasingly complex jurisdictions.
The temporal horizon of governance also differs significantly. Western parties are often constrained by short electoral cycles, which can incentivize short-term policy decisions aimed at immediate voter approval. The Chinese governing structure operates on multi-decade timelines, utilizing mechanisms like Five-Year Plans to pursue sustained strategic objectives. Accountability in the West is primarily exercised through the ballot box, while the Chinese system emphasizes internal disciplinary mechanisms, strict performance metrics, and the delivery of tangible socioeconomic outcomes as the basis of political legitimacy.
Given these structural and functional differences, the term “political party” is therefore insufficient when applied to China’s context.
A more accurate alternative descriptor would be a “governing ecosystem.” This term captures the pervasive, multi-layered integration of the organization within all levels of Chinese society and state administration, highlighting its role as an operational environment rather than a standalone electoral competitor.
Another alternative way to describe the Communist Party of China would be “civilizational governing apparatus,” which reflects its function in managing a vast, historically continuous state with a focus on long-term institutional stability, meritocratic administration, and holistic national development, respectful of Chinese characteristics, in the sense that it has scaled up the homogeneity and unity of the traditional Chinese family and nation into the homogeneity and unity of modern family and nation.
This explains the speed, the success and the resilience of China’s development despite all the obstacles the West has raised before it, as well as the stability and safety of the Chinese society.
Angelo Giuliano and Laurent Michelon
Angelo Giuliano is a Swiss-certified financial expert and China-based consultant. He holds an EMBA from Fudan University and Washington University, studied Mandarin Chinese in Taiwan and at Yunnan University, and has lived in China since 1995. As a geopolitical and financial analyst, he focuses on China and the global shift from U.S. dominance toward multipolarity. Follow his analysis on X: @angeloinchina
Laurent Michelon is an entrepreneur and geopolitical analyst based in China. A graduate of the Paris Institute of Political Science (IEP Paris, International Relations) of the National Institute for Oriental Studies (INALCO, Chinese), and holder of a post-MD in International Relations (IEP Paris, 2002), he has been based in Greater China for over 25 years, where he worked in French cultural diplomacy and for various international communications groups before developing his consulting business for European companies in China and for Chinese multinationals in Europe.
In 2022, he published “Understanding the China-West Relations: The Reluctant Superpower against the Isolated Hegemon” (in French). The book was reissued in 2024 in an updated and augmented edition, and published in China the same year by Joint Publishing 三聯出版社.
Follow his analysis on X: @LAURENTMICHELON and Telegram: @la_realgeopolitik
“Industry, agriculture, commerce, education, the military, administration and the Party: in these seven areas, the Party rules everything.“ Prime Minister Zhou Enlai in his Report to the 10th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, 1973. President Xi Jinping confirmed the durability of this principle in 2017 in his Report to the 19th CCP Congress: “In the Party, the State, military and civil affairs, education, at the four cardinal points as well as at the centre, the Party rules everything.“ 党 政 军 民 学，东 西 南 北 中，党 是 领导一切的。
Michelon, Laurent, “Comprendre la relation Chine-Occident, La superpuissance réticente contre l’hégémon isolé”, TheBookEdition.com, 2024, p. 153, https://www.amazon.fr/Comprendre-relation-Chine-Occident-Laurent-Michelon/dp/B0DNVPY6FQ
http://en.npc.gov.cn.cdurl.cn/2021-12/04/c_687613.htm
